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The contents of this special issue are representative of the diversity and originality of
modern labor economics. The papers, which appear in author-alphabetical order,
cover the economics of mandates, the intergenerational transmission of education,
the course of re-employment over the business cycle, the setting of reservation
wages by unemployed job seekers, the relation between crime and the stringency
with which unemployment benefits are applied, and the employment consequences
of mergers and acquisitions.
In the opening theoretical paper, Addison, Barrett, and Siebert document how
insurance-type mandates may improve both worker welfare and equity. The
downside risk of a reduction in output is shown to be increasing in the diversity
of labor market contracts, which risk can be limited by targeting. In a new wrinkle,
the authors demonstrate how government provision might dominate mandates by
preserving separations.
Next, Bauer and Riphahn tackle an increasingly important issue in human capital,
namely, the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment. The authors
examine the covariation of parental background and the educational opportunities of
children in a framework that distinguishes between native and immigrant youth and
further between the country of origin of immigrants. Using the Swiss census for
2000, the authors report that parents’ education is one of the strongest correlates of
the educational attainment of their offspring, with marginal effects that differ across
country of origin. Evidence of material intergenerational mobility is also reported
along with the factors that facilitate and detract from this.
Imbens and Lynch examine the relation between length of joblessness and the
business cycle, paying close attention to the changing characteristics of those who
become unemployed over the cycle. Cyclical effects on joblessness are theoretically
ambiguous because increases in unemployment may reduce the reservation wage at
the same time as the probability of receiving a job offer falls. Using NLSY79 panel
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data, the authors report evidence of both negative duration dependence (i.e.
declining reemployment hazards) and a negative effect of aggregate unemployment
rates on reemployment probabilities. That said, they also report that the interaction
term between unemployment and duration dependence is positive, meaning that
workers are less damaged by a long spell of joblessness in circumstances (i.e. areas
and intervals) of high unemployment than their counterparts with a long spell of
joblessness in circumstances of low unemployment. Vulgo: scarring is more
corrosive in tight labor markets.
Analysts have comparatively little information on one of the key constructs in
unemployment duration analysis: the formation and course of reservation wages over
the jobless spell. In a novel analysis, using data from the 1996 Fokker liquidation,
Kriechel and Pfann offer a dynamic reservation wage model with updating, where
workers learn in clubs of the successful labor market matches of their former co-
workers. Among other things, the authors find that similar workers who locate high-
wage jobs promote increases in the reservation wages of their unemployed
counterparts, and in their (predicted) search time
In recent years, many governments have sought to reduce unemployment by
cutting back on the subsidy extended unemployed job seekers by the unemployment
insurance system. In the next contribution, Machin and Marie examine the intriguing
notion that tighter rules may have unintended consequences as those denied benefits
or otherwise sanctioned turn to crime. The authors thus investigate how individuals
on the margins of crime react to changes in economic incentives. They offer three
levels of evidence to suggest that benefit reform—specifically, that introduced under
the British Jobseekers Allowance program in 1996—might pose serious social costs.
Adverse consequences may thus attach to some popular contemporary labor market
reforms.
The final paper by Margolis considers the employment consequences of mergers
and acquisitions. Acquisitions no less than outsourcing have attracted considerable
public disquiet in recent years. Margolis suggests that this alarm may have been
overdone. Using French linked employer–employee data he shows that although
layoffs are greater in the acquired firm than in the acquiring firm, any adverse
implications for employment are short term in nature and erode fairly quickly.
Indeed, after three years, the employment continuity of workers in acquired firms
exceeds by a considerable margin that of workers in the generality the generality of
firms. Another interesting finding from this study is that the workers most likely to
separate are also those who can find jobs most easily.
Finally, I welcome this opportunity to again thank the contributors to this special
issue of the Portuguese Economic Journal for their superb cooperation. Each
contributor had to meet a very tight deadline for the delivery of the initial draft and
then another following on the comments of two referees. An unusual debt of
gratitude is also owed to the 12 referees for the quality and speed of their
deliberations.
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